Different from the traditional public key encryption, searchable public key encryption allows a data owner to encrypt his data under a user's public key in such a way that the user can generate search token keys using her secret key and then query an encryption storage server. On receiving such a search token key, the server filters all or related stored encryptions and returns matched ones as response.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a user Bob who sends email to another user Alice encrypted under Alice's public key. An email gateway is configured to check whether emails contain the keyword "urgent" so that it could route emails accordingly. On the other hand, Alice does not wish to give the gateway the ability to decrypt all her messages. Boneh et al. in [7] define and construct a mechanism -public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) that allows Alice to provide a token key to the gateway so that the latter can test whether the word "urgent" is a keyword in the email while without learning anything else about the email.
In a PEKS scheme [7] , to send an encrypted email message msg with keywords s1, . . . , sn to Alice, Bob computes
[EA pub (msg)||PEKS(A pub , s1)|| · · · ||PEKS(A pub , sn)],
where A pub is Alice's public key. After Alice submitting a token key TK s ′ for keyword s ′ , the email gateway can decide whether this encrypted message matches with TK s ′ by testing each keyword encryption PEKS(A pub , si) against TK s ′ iteratively. If there exists si satisfying si = s ′ , the gateway deems that the entire encrypted message is matched and then takes appropriate actions on the email accordingly. The first part of the ciphertext above, i.e., EA pub (msg), is normally ignored when studying a PEKS scheme, since its security can be achieved via the traditional public key encryption. Except stated explicitly, ciphertexts of a public key encryption with keyword search scheme consist of only the keyword encryptions. Therefore, informally, the basic security requirement for a public key encryption with keyword search is that the email gateway or the storage server does not learn any information about encrypted keywords unless it has the knowledge of a matched token key.
The PEKS scheme in [7] only supports equality queries. However, more expressive search filters, e. g., conjunctive keywords or even boolean formulas, are required in many applications. For comparability, we use the email gateway application scenario in [7] to illustrate this. Two typical expressive search filters at the gateway may look like: Eg. 1: sender: Bob AND priority: urgent Eg. 2: (sender: Bob AND priority: urgent) OR subject: recruitment where the first example means that Alice wants the email gateway to return all urgent emails sent by Bob, and the second one means that all emails either sent by Bob with urgent priority or having a subject of recruitment should be forwarded to Alice. With regard to the conjunctive keyword search problem presented by Eg. 1, security concerns and high storage overhead (i.e., storage overhead is exponential in the number of keyword fields) overrule two straightforward solutions, namely set intersection and meta keywords [26, 16] . The set intersection is built upon simple PEKS scheme, such as the one in [7] . Given a conjunction of keywords, the gateway is provided with a search capability for every individual keyword in the conjunction. For every keyword, the gateway finds the set of ciphertexts that match that keyword, then returns the intersection of all the sets. This approach allows the gateway to learn a lot of extra information in addition to the results of the conjunctive query. The meta keyword approach is to define a meta keyword for every possible conjunction of keywords. These meta keywords are then associated with messages like regular keywords. The obvious drawback of this approach is that m keywords require 2 m meta keywords in order to accommodate all possible conjunctive queries. We refer interested readers to [26, 16] for more details.
The schemes proposed in [26, 19, 10, 20, 33] solve the conjunctive keyword search problem in the public-key setting. Especially, Boneh and Waters [10] present a general framework for analyzing and constructing searchable public key encryption (S-PKE) 1 schemes for various families of predicates. Boneh and Waters [10] then construct public key encryption schemes that support comparison queries (such as greater-than) and general subset queries. They also support arbitrary conjunctions. However, to the best of our knowledge, except S-PKE schemes constructed from innerproduct predicate encryption [20] , existing schemes mostly focus on conjunctive keyword search and do not work in the situations involving keyword disjunction, such as Eg. 2.
The notion of inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) is first introduced by Katz et al. [20] . In a predicate encryption scheme, secret keys correspond to predicates and ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes; a secret key SK f corresponding to a predicate f can be used to decrypt a ciphertext associated with an attribute set I if and 1 S-PKE is a generalization of PEKS. PEKS refers to public key encryption supporting simple encrypted keyword search predicates such as equality queries while S-PKE refers to public key encryption supporting more expressive keyword search predicates.
only if f (I) = 1. The special case of inner product predicates is obtained by having each attributes set correspond to a vector ⃗ x and each predicate f ⃗ v correspond to a vector ⃗ v, where f ⃗ v (⃗ x) = 1 iff ⃗ x · ⃗ v = 0 (⃗ x · ⃗ v denotes the standard inner-product). IPE can be extended to construct a solution to disjunctive keyword search. However, as shown in [20] , the solution has a superpolynomial blowup in ciphertext size and search token key size, thus is not efficient. As described in [20] , the conjunction predicate ANDs 1 ,s 2 where ANDs 1 ,s 2 (x1, x2) = 1 iff both x1 = s1 and x2 = s2, and the disjunction predicate ORs 1 ,s 2 where ORs 1 ,s 2 = 1 iff either x1 = s1 or x2 = s2, can be encoded as the following bi-variate polynomials
where r in the first polynomial is a random element chosen from a proper domain. Following this principle, we could easily encode Eg. 2 as a tri-variate polynomial
where s1, s2, s3 denote "sender: Bob", "priority: urgent" and "subject: recruitment", respectively. To support the search type in Eg. 2, the sender Bob could take advantage of IPE to encrypt his email with the vector ⃗ x = (x1x2x3, x1x2, x1x3, x2x3, x1, x2, x3, 1), where x1, x2, x3 are keywords in the email; the receiver Alice generates her token key using the predicate vector ⃗ v = (0, 0, r, 1, −rs3, −s3, −rs1 − s2, s3(rs1 + s2)) (i.e., the coefficients of the above equation). Obviously, the gateway can successfully match Alice's query to the encrypted email as long as the search filter Eg. 2 is satisfied. As pointed out in [20] , the complexity of the resulting scheme is proportional to d t , where t is the number of variables and d is the maximum degree (of the resulting polynomial) in each variable.
These facts motivate us to construct an efficient public key encryption supporting expressive search.
Our Contribution
In this paper, based on the key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [22] recently, we present an efficient construction of a S-PKE scheme which supports arbitrary monotone boolean predicate, such as Eg. 1 and Eg. 2. We prove that our scheme is secure in the standard model. Inheriting from [22] , our scheme has the restriction that each keyword field can only be used once in a predicate.
In a KP-ABE scheme [30, 17] , every ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes (i.e., keywords in S-PKE), and every user's secret key is associated with an access structure on attributes (i.e. search predicate in S-PKE). A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext only if the set of attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfies the access structure associated with the user's private key. However, the attributes (i.e., keywords) associated with ciphertexts in existing KP-ABE scheme, including Lewko et al. 's KP-ABE scheme [22] , is not anonymous, thus a KP-ABE scheme can not be used as S-PKE. In our S-PKE scheme, the ciphertext does not reveal any information about the keywords. In fact, our S-PKE scheme can be easily extended to obtain the first efficient anonymous KP-ABE scheme, in which given a ciphertext a probabilistic polynomial time adversary cannot learn any information about the associated attribute set.
Related Work
In this section, we briefly review literature on searchable public key encryption.
Boneh et al. [7] initiate the research on PEKS and give a specific construction, known as the BDOP-PEKS scheme, which only supports equality queries. Abdalla et al. [1] formally define the property of consistency for PEKS, and state the relation between PEKS and anonymous identity based encryption (IBE). Based on different techniques or conditions, several PEKS constructions, also supporting equality queries, are presented in [13, 21, 5] . Noticing that the encryption in BDOP-PEKS and its followings is not invertible, Fuhr and Paillier [15] introduce the ability of decryption to searchable encryption (DSE) in which the receiver is allowed to decrypt the keyword ciphertext using an additional decryption algorithm.
Park et al. [26] propose the notion of public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search (PECK), then Hwan and Lee [19] make improvement on the sizes of ciphertext and private key, and extend the technique to multi-user setting. Zhang and Zhang [33] study a similar problem, namely conjunctive with subset keywords search (PECSK). Bringer et al. [11] take advantage of Bloom Filter [6] to construct an error-tolerant searchable encryption, permitting to search on encrypted data with only an approximation of some keywords. Boneh and Waters [10] present a general framework for analyzing and constructing S-PKE for various families of predicates and construct several schemes that support arbitrary conjunctions. Katz et al. [20] propose the notion of inner-product predicate encryption (IPE), which can be extended to construct S-PKE with disjunctive keyword search. However, as shown in [20] , the resulting solution suffers from a superpolynomial blowup in ciphertext size and search token key size.
In addition to designing schemes with more expressive search criteria, there are also efforts [2, 34] studying the combination of a public key encryption (PKE) scheme and a PEKS scheme. Baek et al. [2] call their proposed scheme "PKE/PEKS" and define its security against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-PKE/PEKS-CCA). The resulting construction is based on a variation of ElGamal encryption and BDOP-PEKS, and is proved secure in the random oracle model. Zhang and Imai [34] give a generic construction which is based on secure PEKS schemes and tag-KEM/DEM schemes, and is proved secure without random oracles.
Some literature aim at enhancing the original security definition of PEKS in [7] . Byun et al. [12] define off-line keyword guessing (KG) attacks and show that BDOP-PEKS is insecure against KG attacks unless there exists a secure channel between the receiver and the server (i.e., the storage server or the email gateway). PEKS schemes which are immune to KG attacks (namely PEKS with a designated server, dPEKS for short [29] and its enhancement [27] , or secure channel free PEKS, SCF-PEKS for short [3, 18, 14] ) have also been reported in the literature. Tang and Chen [32] provide another approach to resist KG attacks, but their construction seems more like a searchable encryption scheme in the private-key setting. The security of the search token key (trapdoor), which ensures an adversary cannot learn the search criteria from a token key generated by the receiver, is discussed in [9, 28] and it is known that such a security notion can only be achieved in the private-key setting [31] .
We omit the literature on searchable encryption in the private-key setting since they are outside the scope of this paper.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries and formally defines security of our S-PKE. Section 3 describes the proposed construction and its security proof. Section 4 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
If S is a set, then s 
Access Structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure [4] In our context, keywords play the role of parties and we restrict our attention to monotone access structures (i.e., search predicates). It is possible to (inefficiently) realize general access structures using our techniques by treating the negation of a keyword as a separate keyword.
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Our construction will employ linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS). We use the definition adapted from [4] 
(i).
It is shown in [4] that every linear secret-sharing scheme according to the above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, defined as follows. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, . . . , ℓ} be defined as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then there exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then ∑ i∈I ωiλi = s. Let Ai denotes the i th row of A, we have ∑ i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). These constants {ωi} can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generation matrix A [4] . Note that, for unauthorized sets, no such constants {ωi} exist.
Boolean Formulas Access structures (i.e., search predicates) might also be described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. Using standard techniques [4] one can convert any monotonic boolean formula into an LSSS representation. We can represent the boolean formula as an access tree. An access tree of ℓ nodes will result in an LSSS matrix of ℓ rows. We refer the reader to the appendix of [24] for a discussion on how to perform this conversion.
Searchable Public Key Encryption
During the rest of the paper, we follow the general framework and notation for S-PKE as defined in [10] . Suppose a user Bob is about to send an encrypted document to Alice with keywords s1, . . . , sn, where n is the number of keyword fields. If documents were emails for example, we could define 4 keyword fields, such as "From", "To", "Date" and "Subject". Bob sends the following message:
where A pub is Alice's public key, msg is the email body, and S-PKE is an algorithm with properties discussed below. To simplify the description, we ignore EA pub [M ] that can be encrypted with any secure public key encryption.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all keyword fields are defined for every document, as employed in [16] . From here onwards, we identify a document with the vector of n keywords. We denote a document by D = (s1, . . . , sn), where si is the keyword of document D in the i th keyword field. A S-PKE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup(1 λ ) takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public key PK and secret key SK.
Encrypt(PK, D = (s1, . . . , sn)) takes as input the public key PK and a document D = (s1, . . . , sn) and outputs a ciphertext CD.
GenToken(PK, SK, P) takes as input the public key PK, the secret key SK and a predicate P and outputs a token key TKP .
Test(PK, TKP , CD) takes as input the public key PK, a token key TKP ← GenToken(PK, SK, P) and a ciphertext CD ← Encrypt(PK, D = (s1, . . . , sn)). It outputs "yes" if the keywords (s1, . . . , sn) satisfies the predicate P (i.e., P(D) = 1) and "no" otherwise.
We now give the security model for S-PKE in the sense of semantic-security. We need to ensure that an S − PKE.Encrypt (A pub , D = (s1, . . . , sn) ) does not reveal any information about D unless TKP with P(D) = 1 is available. We define security against an active attacker who is able to obtain token keys TKP for any P of his choice. Even under such attack the attacker should not be able to distinguish an encryption of a document D0 from an encryption of a document D1 for which he did not obtain the token key TKP such that P(D0) = 1 or P(D1) = 1. Formally, we define security against an active attacker A using the following game between a challenger and the attacker:
Setup:
The challenger runs Setup(1 λ ) to obtain a public key PK and secret key SK. It gives the public key PK to the adversary A and keeps SK to itself.
Query phase 1:
The adversary A adaptively queries the challenger for token keys corresponding to predicates P1, . . . , Pq. In response, the challenger runs TKP i ← GenToken(PK, SK, Pi) and gives the token key TKP i to A, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
Challenge: The adversary A submits two documents D0, D1, subject to the restriction that, D0 and D1 cannot satisfy any of queried predicates. The challenger selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets CD β ← Encrypt(PK, D β ) and sends CD β to the adversary as its challenge ciphertext.
Query phase 2:
The adversary continues to adaptively query the challenger for token keys corresponding to predicates with the added restriction that none of these can be satisfied by D0 or D1.
Guess:
The adversary A outputs its guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β and wins the game if β = β ′ .
The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as
where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. 
Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We will construct our scheme in composite order bilinear groups whose order is the product of four distinct primes. Composite order bilinear groups were first introduced in [8] .
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a tuple (p1, p2, p3, p4, G, GT , e), where p1, p2, p3, p4 are distinct primes, G and GT are cyclic groups of order N = p1p2p3p4, and e : G × G → GT is a map such that
We further require that multiplication in G and GT , as well as the bilinear map e, are computable in time polynomial in λ. We use Gp 1 , Gp 2 , Gp 3 , Gp 4 to denote the subgroups of G having order p1, p2, p3, p4, respectively. Observe that G = Gp 1 × Gp 2 × Gp 3 × Gp 4 . Note also that if g1 ∈ Gp 1 and g2 ∈ Gp 2 then e(g1, g2) = 1. A similar rule holds whenever e is applied to elements in distinct subgroups.
We now state the complexity assumptions we use. Utilizing the theorems proposed in [20] , one can easily to prove that the assumptions hold in the generic group model. Assumption 1. Let G be as above. We define the following distribution: 
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1 is defined as
Adv 1 A = | Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.(p1, p2, p3, p4, G, GT , e) ← G(1 λ ), N = p1p2p3p4, g, X1 $ ← Gp 1 , X2, Y2 $ ← Gp 2 , X3, Y3 $ ← Gp 3 , X4 $ ← Gp 4 , D = (G, GT , N, e, g, X1X2, Y2Y3, X3, X4), T1 $ ← Gp 1 × Gp 2 × Gp 3 , T2 $ ← Gp 1 × Gp 3 .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 2 is defined as
Adv 2 A = | Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 5. we say G satisfies Assumption 2 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv
(p1, p2, p3, p4, G, GT , e) ← G(1 λ ), N = p1p2p3p4, s $ ← ZN , g, h $ ← Gp 1 , g2, X2 $ ← Gp 2 , X3 $ ← Gp 3 , X4, Z ′ $ ← Gp 4 , B24, D24 $ ← Gp 2 × Gp 4 , D = (G, GT , N, e, g, g2, hX2, hZ ′ , g s B24, X3, X4, T ), T1 = h s D24, T2 $ ← Gp 1 × Gp 2 × Gp 4 .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3 is defined as
Adv 3 A = | Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 6. we say G satisfies Assumption 3 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv

OUR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION
Recall that a document D is identified by a vector of n keywords (s1, . . . , sn), where si is the keyword of document D in the i th keyword field. For notational purposes, let i denote the i th keyword field. Our S-PKE scheme supports arbitrary monotone boolean predicate. We express an monotone boolean predicate by an LSSS (A, ρ, T ), where A is a ℓ × m share-generating matrix, ρ is a map from each row of A to a keyword field (i.e., ρ is a function from {1, . . . , ℓ} to {1, . . . , n}), T can be parsed as (t ρ(1) , . . . , t ρ(ℓ) ) and t ρ(i) is the value (i.e., keyword) of keyword field ρ(i) specified by the predicate .   Using our notations, a document D = (s1, . . . , sn) 1, 0, . . . , 0) . We define I A,ρ as the set of minimum subsets of {1, . . . , ℓ} that satisfies (A, ρ). By "minimum", we mean the subset cannot become smaller while still satisfying (A, ρ) .
The proposed S-PKE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
The setup algorithm first runs G(1 λ ) to obtain (p1, p2, p3, p4, G, GT , e) with G = Gp 1 × Gp 2 × Gp 3 × Gp 4 , where G and GT are cyclic groups of order N = p1p2p3p4. Next it chooses g, u, h1, . . . , hn ∈ Gp 1 , X3 ∈ Gp 3 , X4, Z, Z0, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ Gp 4 and α ∈ ZN uniformly at random. The public key is published as PK = (N, gZ, e(g, g) α , U = uZ0, {Hi = hi · Zi} 1≤i≤n , X4). The secret key is SK = (g, u, h1, . . . , hn, X3, α).
This encryption algorithm chooses s ∈ ZN and Z1,0, {Z1,i} 1≤i≤n ∈ Gp 4 uniformly at random. The corresponding ciphertext CD = ( C, C0, {Ci} 1≤i≤n ) is computed as 
GenToken(PK, SK, P = (A, ρ, T )): Suppose
K1,j = g A j ·v (u t ρ(j) h ρ(j) ) r j R1,j, K2,j = g r j R2,j.
Test(PK, TKP
. , ℓ} that satisfies (A, ρ).
It then checks if there exists an I ∈ I A,ρ that satisfies
where ∑ i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). If no element in I A,ρ satisfies the above equation, it outputs "no". Otherwise, it outputs "yes".
Efficiency
The size of the public key, a token key and a ciphertext are (n + 3)|G| + |GT |, 2ℓ|G| and (n + 1)|G| + |GT |, respectively, where |G| and |GT | are the lengths of the bitrepresentation of a group element in G and GT respectively. Compared with expressive searchable public key encryption scheme constructed from IPE [20] , the size of a ciphertext (resp. a key) in our scheme is linear with the number of keyword fields n (resp. the size of the search predicate), not superpolynomial.
For a search predicate (A, ρ, T ), let ι1 = |I A,ρ |, I A,ρ = {I1, . . . , Iι 1 } and ι2 = |I1| + · · · + |Iι 1 |. The computational costs of an encryption, and a test under (A, ρ, T ) are (n + 1)t G m e + t G T e and ≤ 2ι2tp + ι1t G T m e , respectively, where tp, t G T e , t G m e and t G T m e are the computational costs of bilinear map, exponentiation in GT , multi exponentiation in G and GT , respectively.
Discussion
Our S-PKE scheme is based on the KP-ABE scheme [22] proposed by Lewko et al. . Since the attributes (i.e., keywords) in Lewko et al. 's KP-ABE scheme [22] is not anonymous, it is not enough to obtain a secure S-PKE. On the contrary, our S-PKE scheme can be easily extended to obtain the first efficient anonymous KP-ABE scheme. We remark that the KP-ABE scheme in [22] works in a small universe of attributes, while the keywords in our S-PKE scheme have a large universe (i.e., ZN ).
Similar to the KP-ABE scheme in [22] , our proposed S-PKE scheme has the restriction that each keyword field can only be used once in a predicate, which is called one-use S-PKE. We can obtain a secure S-PKE scheme where keyword fields are used multiple times (up to a constant number of uses fixed at setup) from a one-use scheme by applying the generic transformation given in Lewko et al. [22] . While the transformation does incur some cost in public key and ciphertext size, it does not increase the size of the token key. Utilizing the techniques proposed by Lewko and Waters [25] recently, it is possible to eliminate the above mentioned efficiency loss and allow unrestricted use of keyword fields while still proving security in the standard model.
Security
Note that in our construction, all components of the public key (except e(g, g) α ) and the ciphertext (except C = e(g, g) αs ) have a Gp 4 part. This formation allows us to prove that the ciphertext CD does not reveal any information about D unless TKP with P(D) = 1 is available; it does not affect the test algorithm, since no component in a token key has a Gp 4 part. We now state the security theorem of our S-PKE scheme.
Theorem 1. If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then the proposed S-PKE scheme is secure.
Proof. Following the approach by Lewko and Waters [23] , we define two additional structures: semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys. These will not be used in the real system, but will be used in our proof.
Semi-functional Ciphertext
Let g2 denote a generator of the subgroup Gp 2 . A semi-functional ciphertext is created as follows. We first use the encryption algorithm to form a normal ciphertext CD = ( C, C0, {Ci} 1≤i≤n ). Then, we choose a random exponent c ∈ ZN . We also choose random values ηi ∈ ZN associated to keywords. The semi-functional ciphertext C is set to be
) .
It should be noted that the values ηi are chosen randomly once and then fixed -these same values will also be involved in semi-functional keys which we will define below.
Semi-functional Key A semi-functional key will take on one of two forms. To create a semi-functional key, we first use the key generation algorithm to form a normal token key TKP = ((A, ρ, T ), {K1,j, K2,j} 1≤j≤ℓ ). Then, we choose random values γj ∈ ZN associated with row j of the ℓ × m matrix A. We also choose a random vector w ∈ Z m N and set δj = Aj · w. The semi-functional key of type 1 is set as
A semi-functional key of type 2 is formed without the terms g
and g γ j 2 (one could also interpret this as setting γj = 0):
, K2,j} 1≤j≤ℓ ). We will prove the security of our scheme based on Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games. The first game, Game real is the real security game (the ciphertext and all token keys are normal). In the next game, Game0, all of token keys will be normal, but the challenge ciphertext will be semi-functional. We let q denote the number of token key queries made by the attacker. For k from 1 to q and ϱ from 1 to n, we define Game k,1 : In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional, the first k−1 token keys are semi-functional of type 2, the k th token key is semi-functional of type 1, and the remaining token keys are normal.
Game k,2 : In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional, the first k token keys are semi-functional of type 2, and the remaining token keys are normal. For notational purposes, we think of Game0,2 as another way of denoting Game0 and Game Final 0 as another way of denoting Gameq,2. In the final game, Game Finaln , all token keys are semi-functional, and the ciphertext CD β = ( C, C0, {C1, . . . , Cn}) is a semi-functional encryption with C1, . . . , Cn randomly chosen from Gp 1 × Gp 2 × Gp 4 (thus the ciphertext is independent of D0 and D1 provided by the adversary). It is clear that in the final game, no adversary can have advantage greater than 0.
We prove that these games are indistinguishable in the following four lemmas. Therefore, we conclude that the advantage of the adversary in Game real (i.e., the real security game) is negligible. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. (N, gZ, e(g, g) α , U, {Hi} 1≤i≤n , X4).
It can generate normal token keys in response to A's token key requests by using the key generation algorithm, since it knows the SK = (g, u, h1, . . . , hn, X3, α). At some point, A sends B two documents D0, D1. B chooses β ∈ {0, 1} randomly and does the following:
2. Let D β = (s β,1 , . . . , s β,n ) . B computes
3. B sets the challenge ciphertext as CD β = ( C, C0, {Ci} 1≤i≤n ) and sends it to A.
where (N, gZ, e(g, g) α , U, {Hi} 1≤i≤n , X4).
Note that B knows the secret key SK = (g, u, h1, . . . , hn, X3, α) associated with PK. Let us now explain how B answers the j th key query for a predicate (A, ρ, T = (t ρ (1) , . . ., t ρ(ℓ) )). For j < k, B creates a semi-functional key of type 2 by choosing a random vector v such that 1 · v = α, a random vector w ′ , random exponents ri ∈ ZN , random elements R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gp 3 , and setting:
We note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type 2 because the value of Ai · w ′ modulo p2 is uncorrelated to its value modulo p3.
For j > k, B creates a normal token key by running the key generation algorithm since it knows SK.
To answer the k th key quest for (A, ρ, T = (t ρ (1) , . . ., t ρ(ℓ) )), B chooses a random vector v ′ such that v ′ · 1 = α, a random vector w such that w · 1 = 0, random exponents γi ∈ ZN , random elements R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gp 3 and sets: (N, gZ, e(g, g) α , U, {Hi} 1≤i≤n , X4).
The responses to all key queries and challenge ciphertexts are the same as in Lemma 2, except that the k th query which is given below.
To answer the k th key quest for (A, ρ, T = (t ρ (1) , . . ., t ρ(ℓ) )), B chooses a random vector v such that v · 1 = α, a random vector w, random exponentsγi ∈ ZN , random elements R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gp 3 and sets:
